In this paper we study a formal notion of knowledge forgetting in S5 modal logic. We propose four postulates and prove that these postulates precisely characterize both semantic and logical properties of knowledge forgetting. We then investigate possible applications of knowledge forgetting in various epistemic reasoning scenarios. In particular, we show that different forms of knowledge updates may be represented via knowledge forgetting. We also demonstrate how knowledge forgetting can be used in formalizing and reasoning about knowledge games with bounded memory.
Introduction
Epistemic reasoning concerns the problem of how to reason about agents' epistemic states (knowledge) in a dynamic environment, e.g. [6, 26] . In the last decade, it has been demonstrated that epistemic reasoning has many important applications in computer science and AI [23, 25] . Amongst various theories and approaches, one major assumption in the study of epistemic reasoning is that agents always remember their previous knowledge (i.e. agents have perfect recall) [11, 24] . However, as pointed by Fagin et al.: "There are often scenarios of interest where we want to model the fact that certain information is discarded. In practice, for example, an agent may simply not have enough memory capacity to remember everything he has learned." [11, page 129] . Hence knowledge forgetting is an important behaviour for an agent under certain circumstances.
As a logical notion, forgetting was first studied in propositional and first order logics from a KR perspective by Lin and Reiter [21] . Over the years, researchers have used the notion of propositional forgetting to deal with issues in abductive reasoning, belief revision/update, and reasoning about knowledge [19, 22, 27] . In recent years, theories of forgetting have also been proposed under the answer set programming semantics and used in solving logic program conflicts and updates [10, 28] . We can see that forgetting has many applications in knowledge representation and reasoning.
However, existing forgetting definitions in propositional logic and answer set programming are not directly applicable in modal logics. For instance, in propositional forgetting theory, forgetting atom q from T ≡ (p → q)∧((q ∧r) → s) is equivalent to a formula T [q/ ] ∨ T [q/⊥], where T [q/ ] is a formula obtained from T by replacing each q with and T [q/⊥] is obtained from T by replacing each q with ⊥, which is (r → s) ∨ ¬p. However, this method cannot be extended to an S5 modal logic formula. Consider an S5 formula T ≡ ¬Kq ∧ ¬K¬q. If we want to forget atom q from T by using the above method, we would have T [q/ ]∨T [q/⊥] ≡ ⊥. This is obviously not correct because after forgetting q, the agent's knowledge set should not become inconsistent! An earlier formal study on the concept of forgetting in epistemic logic (called knowledge forgetting) was Baral and Zhang's work on knowledge update [1] , where they treated knowledge forgetting as a special form of update with the effect ¬Kφ∧ ¬K¬φ: after knowledge forgetting a propositional formula φ, the agent would neither know φ nor ¬φ.
Recently, van Ditmarsch et al. have also considered the issue of forgetting in a modal logical context [8] . Their forgetting concept is similar to Baral and Zhang's forgetting update in the sense that after (knowledge) forgetting atom p the agent should conclude ¬Kp ∧ ¬K¬p, but based on a dynamic modal logic. They showed that their dynamic modal logic of forgetting is sound and complete.
While both Baral and Zhang's and van Ditmarsch et al. ' s work have made interesting contributions to formalize the notion of knowledge forgetting, its underlying semantics still remains unclear. For instance, neither of their knowledge forgetting notions always results in intuitive solutions. Specifically, by restricting to classical propositional logic, their forgetting notions are not consistent with propositional variable forgetting.
In recent modal logic research, notions of bisimulation quantification and uniform interpolation have been extensively studied, which eventually provide semantic and logical interpretations for knowledge forgetting. Based on the notion of bisimulation quantification, French, Ghilardi and Zawadowski defined the semantics of formula ∃V φ [12, 14] , where V is a finite set of propositional atoms and φ is a formula in certain modal logic. Intuitively, an interpretation M is a model of ∃V φ iff there is a model M of φ and M and M are bisimilar with exception over atoms in V , i.e. M and M are V -bisimilar.
Ghilardi et al. studied the notion of uniform interpolation in modal logic, and indicated that S5 has the uniform interpolation property. Informally, this means that for every S5 formula φ and every finite set V of atoms, there exists an S5 formula ∃V φ which does not contain atoms from V but is logically closest to φ in some sense [15] . It is not difficult to show that this logical definition of ∃V φ is equivalent to French's semantic interpretation of ∃V φ [12] . Nevertheless, two major issues still remain unaddressed. Firstly, it is not clear yet whether we can precisely capture both semantic and logical interpretations of knowledge forgetting through general principles or postulates, as in the analogous work in belief revision and update [17] . Secondly, the application of knowledge forgetting to different epistemic reasoning has not been thoroughly studied. In this paper we propose four general postulates for knowledge forgetting and show that these four postulates precisely characterize the notion of knowledge forgetting described above in S5 modal logic. We then focus on the study of applications of knowledge forgetting in various epistemic reasoning scenarios. Specifically, we study the relationship between knowledge update and knowledge forgetting, and show that knowledge forgetting may be used as a flexible notion to represent different forms of knowledge updates. We also demonstrate how knowledge forgetting can be used in formalizing and reasoning about knowledge games with bounded memory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some logical background and presents a semantic definition of knowledge forgetting under our context. Section 3 proves a representation theorem for knowledge forgetting and studies other related semantic properties. Section 4 shows that different forms of knowledge updates may be represented through knowledge forgetting. Section 5 demonstrates an interesting application of knowledge forgetting in describing knowledge games with bounded memory. Finally section 6 concludes this paper with some remarks.
Defining knowledge forgetting
Our knowledge forgetting will be defined on a basis of propositional modal logic S5. Let Atom be a set of atoms (also called variables). The language L of propositional S5 modal logic is defined recursively by Atom, classical connectives ⊥, ¬, ⊃ and a modal operator K as follows:
where p ∈ Atom. , φ ∧ ψ and φ ∨ ψ, are defined as the standard way. Elements in L are called formulas. Formulas without modal operators are called objective formulas. A knowledge set is a finite set of formulas. Literals are atoms and their negations. Let φ be a formula and Γ a knowledge set, we write V ar(φ) and V ar(Γ) to denote the sets of atoms occurred in φ and Γ respectively.
For convenience, we usually use a, b, c, · · ·, p, q, · · · to denote atoms; φ, ψ, υ, · · · to denote formulas; and Γ, T , · · · to denote knowledge sets. Sometimes, we also use the conjunction φ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ φ n to represent a finite set of formulas {φ 1 , · · · , φ n }.
A Kripke structure is a triple S = W, R, L , where W is a set of possible worlds, R an equivalence relation on W , and L a set of interpretations for each world in W
1
. A Kripke interpretation is a pair M = S, w where w ∈ W . As mentioned in [23] , an S5 Kripke interpretation can be simplified as M = W, w , where W is the set of all possible worlds, each world is identified as a set of atoms, and w ∈ W is called the actual world. In this case, we call M = W, w a k-interpretation.
The satisfaction relation |= between k-interpretations and formulas in L is defined recursively as follows
We say that M is a k-model of φ iff M |= φ. An S5 formula φ is satisfiable if it has a k-model. φ is valid if for each k-interpretation W, w , W, w |= φ. In this case, we also denote |= φ. We write M od(φ) (or M od(Γ) if Γ is a finite set of formulas) to denote the set of all k-models of φ (or Γ resp.). We say that two S5 formulas (knowledge sets) φ and ψ are equivalent, denoted by φ ≡ ψ, iff M od(φ) = M od(ψ). We denote φ |= ψ iff M od(φ) ⊆ M od(ψ). That is, we treat |= as the local consequence relation in S5.
To present a formal definition of knowledge forgetting, we need the concepts of bisimulation [2] and bisimulation quantification that have been studied in modal logic [12, 14] . Let w and w be two worlds identified as two sets of atoms respectively, and V ⊆ Atom a set of atoms. We denote w V w if for all p ∈ Atom \ V , p ∈ w iff p ∈ w . Definition 1 [12] Let M = W, w and M = W , w be two k-interpretations, and V ⊆ Atom a set of atoms. We say that M and M are V -bisimilar (i.e. bisimilar with exception on V ), denoted by M ↔ V M , iff the following conditions hold:
1 In this paper, we will only consider Kripke structures for logic S5 where R is restricted to be an equivalence relation. In the rest of the paper, we will not explicitly mention this whenever there is no confusion. 2 We write W, w |= F if it is not the case that W, w |= F .
Note that even if M ↔ V M , M and M may have different number of worlds. (1) for all pairs w 1 ∈ W 1 and w 2 ∈ W 2 such that w 1 V w 2 , let w ∈ W and (a) p ∈ w iff p ∈ w 2 , (b) for all atoms q ∈ V , q ∈ w iff q ∈ w 1 , (c) for all other atoms q , q ∈ w iff q ∈ w 2 iff q ∈ w 1 ; (2) delete duplicated worlds in W ; (3) let s be the world such that (a) p ∈ s iff p ∈ s 2 , (b) for all atoms q ∈ V , q ∈ s iff q ∈ s 1 , (c) for all other atoms q , q ∈ s iff q ∈ s 2 iff q ∈ s 1 . Then it is easy to verify that
The following are also standard results from bisimulation quantification [12] .
Proposition 2
The relation ↔ V is an equivalence relation. 
From Definition 2, we can see that for each k-model M of Γ, M is a k-model of KForget(Γ, V ). Further, if we simply add all worlds into M that differ from worlds of M only on the evaluation of variables in V , then the newly formed kinterpretation M is also a k-model of KForget(Γ, V ).
Example 1 Consider knowledge sets
We should mention that our knowledge forgetting definition KForget(Γ, V ) is equivalent to the semantic definition of formula ∃V Γ in [12] . It is also equivalent to the notion of uniform interpolation -a logical definition of formula ∃V Γ [15] . Ghilardi et al. further described an algorithm to construct formula ∃V Γ (or KForget(Γ, V ) in our context) with exponential size of Γ.
Semantic characterizations
In this section we study essential semantic properties of knowledge forgetting which have not been addressed in previous work. We will first propose a set of postulates and show that these postulates precisely characterize the semantics of knowledge forgetting. We then discuss other semantic properties of knowledge forgetting. Related computational properties of knowledge forgetting have been studied in [29] .
A representation theorem
Consider a formula φ. Intuitively, if a propositional variable a does not occur in V ar(φ), we may consider that φ is irrelevant to a. It is not surprising that the notion of irrelevance plays an important role in characterizing the semantics of knowledge forgetting. We first give the following formal definition. is an essential requirement for knowledge forgetting: after forgetting some information from a knowledge set, the resulting knowledge set then becomes weaker. Indeed, as demonstrated in propositional variable forgetting [21, 22] , forgetting weakens the original formula. The postulates of positive persistence (PP) and negative persistence (NP) simply state that knowledge forgetting a set of atoms should not affect those positive or negative information respectively that is irrelevant to this set of atoms. Finally, irrelevance (IR) means that after knowledge forgetting, the resulting knowledge set should be irrelevant to those atoms which we have (knowledge) forgotten. We argue that these postulates capture the basic properties that knowledge forgetting should satisfy.
Now we have the following representation theorem which states that our forgetting postulates indeed precisely characterize the underlying knowledge forgetting semantics.
Theorem 1 (Representation theorem) Let Γ and Γ be two knowledge sets and
V ⊆ Atom a set of atoms. Then the following statements are equivalent: 
On the other hand, by postulate (IR), we know that Γ is irrelevant to V . Also note that Γ is a finite set of formulas. Further from postulate (W), we have Γ |= Γ . Therefore,
Theorem 1 is significant in the sense that it provides an "if and only if" characterization on knowledge forgetting. That is, given a knowledge set Γ and a set of atoms V , an S5 formula Γ represents a result of knowledge forgetting V from Γ if Γ satisfies postulates (W), (PP), (NP) and (IR), and vice versa.
Corollary 1 Let Γ be a knowledge base, φ a formula and V a set of atoms. If
IR(φ, V ), then KForget(Γ, V ) |= φ iff Γ |= φ.
Other semantic properties
As we mentioned in Introduction, the notion of forgetting has been defined and used in a variety of contexts under propositional logic [18, 19, 21] . It is important to know the relationship between variable forgetting in propositional logic and knowledge forgetting in S5 propositional modal logic.
Let φ be an objective formula. We use φ[p/⊥] and φ[p/ ] to denote the formulas obtained from φ by replacing atom p with ⊥ and respectively. Then formula
We first have the following result.
Theorem 2 Let φ be an objective formula and V a set of atoms. Then we have
Proof. We prove Result 1 as follows.
On the other hand, suppose that M = W, w is a k-model of Forget(φ, V ). Then there exists w |= φ and w V w. Construct a k-interpretation
. Then for all w 1 ∈ W , w 1 |= Forget(φ, V ), and there exists w 1 |= φ and w 1 V w. Construct a k-interpretation M = W , w such that W is the set of all w 1 mentioned above and w V w. It's clear that M is a k-model of
Theorem 2 simply reveals that propositional variable forgetting is a special case of knowledge forgetting, and also knowledge forgetting of formulas with the form Kφ (where φ is objective) can be achieved through the corresponding propositional variable forgetting. The following results further illustrate other essential semantic properties of knowledge forgetting.
Theorem 3 Let Γ, Γ 1 and Γ 2 be three knowledge sets, φ 1 and φ 2 two formulas, and V a set of atoms. Then the following results hold:
Proof. To prove Result 1, suppose that M is a k-model of Γ. Then M is also a k-model of KForget(Γ, V ). This shows that KForget(Γ, V ) is satisfiable. On the other hand, suppose that Γ is unsatisfiable. Then, M od(Γ) = ∅. It follows that
Result 2 directly follows from Definition 2 and the fact M od(Γ 1 ) = M od(Γ 2 ).
Now we prove Result 3. Suppose that
To prove Result 4, we need to show M od(KForget(
On the other hand, suppose that
We note that the converse of Result 5 in Theorem 3 does not hold generally. For instance, let φ be q ≡ p and ψ be q ≡ r. Then, KForget(φ ∧ ψ, {p}) is equivalent to q ≡ r, while KForget(φ, {p}) ∧ KForget(ψ, {p}) ≡ .
Knowledge forgetting and knowledge update
As we discussed in Section 1, knowledge forgetting and knowledge update represent two different perspectives of modeling an agent's knowledge change. In this section, we show that knowledge forgetting can be also used as a flexible logical notion to represent various knowledge updates. In the rest of this section, we will first compare our knowledge forgetting with Baral and Zhang's knowledge update, and then provide two different methods to define knowledge update operators via knowledge forgetting. We will also restrict our underlying language to be finite, in order to relate our knowledge update to traditional update postulates [17] .
Comparison with Baral and Zhang's forgetting update
Traditional belief revision and update are based on classical propositional logic, e.g. [13, 20] . Recently, Baral and Zhang studied the theory of update based on the finite propositional S5 modal logic, which they called knowledge update [1] . They considered knowledge forgetting is a special kind of update called forgetting update. In particular, let Γ be a knowledge set, and φ an objective formula, then in Baral and Zhang's update formulation, knowledge forgetting φ from Γ is achieved by performing the forgetting update Γ (¬Kφ ∧ ¬K¬φ). Intuitively, this means that after knowledge forgetting φ, the resulting knowledge set will not entail any knowledge about φ: neither knowing φ nor knowing ¬φ.
Since Baral and Zhang's knowledge update deals with arbitrary propositional formulas while ours only considers atoms, we first restrict their forgetting update on atoms in order to make these two formulations comparable. We use notion Γ BZ (¬Ka∧¬K¬a) to denote the result of forgetting update on atom a from Γ by using Baral and Zhang's approach. Then from Proposition 7 in [1] , Γ BZ (¬Ka∧¬K¬a)
can be defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Baral and Zhang's forgetting update
By applying knowledge forgetting definition (i.e. Definition 2), we can see that M od(KForget(Γ, {a})) contains k-models M 0 , M 1 , M 0 , and M 2 , from which we conclude that KForget(Γ, {a}) ≡ Kb.
From Example 2, we can see that even for this simple case, our knowledge forgetting is different from Baral and Zhang's forgetting update. In the above example, we also observe Γ BZ (¬Ka ∧ ¬K¬a) |= Kb although from our intuition knowledge forgetting a should not affect the agent's knowledge about b. In general we have the following result.
Proposition 4 Baral and Zhang's forgetting update defined in Definition 4 does not satisfy forgetting postulates (W), (PP), (NP), and (IR).
Proposition 4 suggests that specifying knowledge forgetting based on knowledge update, as the way proposed in [1] , cannot capture the desired properties of forgetting.
Representing knowledge update via knowledge forgetting
Although Baral and Zhang's forgetting update does not satisfy our forgetting postulates (W), (PP) and (NP), their knowledge update satisfies traditional Katsuno and Mendelzon's update postulates (U1)-(U8) [1, 17] . In the following, we consider how we can represent knowledge update through the notion of knowledge forgetting and whether such knowledge update satisfies these postulates. Firstly, we provide Katsuno and Mendelzon's update postulates as follows.
(U3) If both Γ and φ are satisfiable, then Γ φ is also satisfiable.
A straightforward way to define knowledge update via forgetting seems as follows. Let Γ be a knowledge set and µ a satisfiable S5 formula. Γ is updated by µ, denoted as Γ k 1 µ, is a formula satisfying the following condition:
where
Under the definition of k 1 , the update of Γ with formula µ is achieved by knowledge forgetting all minimal subsets of atoms V min from Γ while keeping KForget(Γ,
Example 3 Let us consider the knowledge update problem discussed in Example 2 once again. Γ ≡ Kb∧(Ka∨K¬a) and µ ≡ ¬Ka∧¬K¬a. As showed in Example 2, Γ BZ µ has four k-models:
Now we consider Γ k 1 µ. Clearly, V min = {a} is the only minimal set of atoms that retains KForget(Γ, V min ) ∧ µ to be consistent. So we have KForget(Γ, V min ) ≡ Kb and hence Γ k 1 µ ≡ Kb ∧ ¬Ka ∧ ¬K¬a, which has two k-models M 1 = {{a, b}, {b}}, {a, b} and M 2 = {{a, b}, {b}}, {b} .
Theorem 4 Knowledge operator k 1 satisfies Katsuno and Mendelzon's update postulates (U1) -(U7), but does not satisfy postulate (U8).
Proof. It is easy to show that k 1 satisfies (U1)-(U4). Now we prove (U5). Suppose that M is a k-model of (Γ k 1 φ)∧ψ. Then there exists V which is minimal and
Therefore V is also a minimal set of atoms such that KForget(Γ, V ) ∧ φ ∧ ψ is consistent. This shows that M is also a k-model of Γ k 1 (φ ∧ ψ).
Now we prove (U6). Suppose that
There exists V which is minimal and M is a k-model of KForget(Γ, V )∧ φ. Therefore M is a k-model of KForget(Γ, V )∧ψ. This shows that KForget(Γ, V )∧ ψ is consistent. Moreover, V is also the minimal set. Otherwise, suppose that V 1 ⊂ V such that KForget(Γ, V 1 )∧ψ is consistent as well. Then, KForget(Γ, V 1 )∧φ should also be consistent, which contradicts to the fact that V is the minimal set of atoms such that KForget(Γ, V ) ∧ ψ is consistent. Hence, M is also a k-model of
Now we prove (U7)
Without loss of generality, suppose that KForget(Γ, V 3 ) ∧ φ is satisfiable, then V 1 is not the minimal set, a contradiction. So M 1 is also a k-model of KForget(Γ, V 3 ) ∧ (φ ∨ ψ).
As a counterexample of (U8), let Γ 1 and Γ 2 be p ∧ q ∧ r and p ∧ ¬r respectively, and
, which is equivalent to ¬p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬r. However,
which is equivalent to ¬p ∧ ¬q. They are not equivalent to each other. 2
Theorem 4 reveals that the knowledge update specified through knowledge forgetting in such a way of (1) does not precisely capture the update semantics. This is not very surprising, because from the definition of operator k 1 , we observe that k 1 seems not to be associated to any Γ's k-model based pre-ordering (see Theorem 3.4 in [17] ).
In the following, we will propose another method of defining knowledge update via knowledge forgetting which will satisfy all postulates (U1)-(U8). For this purpose, we first specify a formula which completely characterizes a given (finite) k-interpretation. Let π be an interpretation and V a finite set of atoms, the characteristic formula of π on V , denoted by C(π, V ), is defined as:
a∈π,a∈V a ∧ b ∈π,b∈V ¬b.
It is clear that π |= C(π, V ).
Now consider a (finite) k-interpretation M = W, w and a finite set V of atoms. Then the characteristic formula of M on V , denoted by C(M, V ), is defined as:
It is not difficult to see that M |= C(M, V ). We can also prove that for any k-
Definition 5 Let Γ be a knowledge set and µ a satisfiable formula. The knowledge update operator k 2 is defined as follows:
where C(M, Atom) is the characteristic formula of M , and V min ⊆ Atom is a minimal subset of atoms that makes KForget(C(M, Atom), V min ) ∧ µ consistent.
Knowledge update defined in Definition 5 can be viewed as a model based update specification, since Γ k 2 µ is achieved by minimally changing every k-model of Γ to make it consistent with µ. Note that the characteristic formula C(M, Atom) is the syntactic representation of model M , and KForget(C(M, Atom), V min ) guarantees the change of M is minimal with respect to µ.
By comparing (1) and (2), we can see the difference between these two knowledge update definitions: in (1) the minimal set V min of forgotten atoms does not depend on any particular k-model of Γ, while in (2), each k-model of Γ has a corresponding minimal set of forgotten atoms. Now we can define a partial ordering over the set of k-interpretations that links to knowledge operator k 2 . Let M, M 1 , and M 2 be three k-interpretations. We say that M 1 is at least as close to M as M 2 is, denoted by M 1 ≤ M M 2 , iff for any
Proposition 5 Let M be a k-interpretation. Then ≤ M defined in Definition 5 is a partial ordering.
Let M be a collection of all k-interpretations and M a k-interpretation, we use M in(M, ≤ M ) to denote the set of all minimal k-interpretations with respect to ordering ≤ M . Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5 Let Γ be a knowledge set and µ a satisfiable S5 formula. Then
Proof. Consider a k-model M ∈ M od(Γ k 2 µ). We show that there exists some M ∈ M od(Γ) such that M ∈ M in(M od(µ), ≤ M ). Definition 5, we know that there exists some M ∈ M od(Γ) such that M ∈ V min M od(KForget(C(M, Atom), V min ) ∧µ). Further, there is a particular V min ⊆ Atom such that M ↔ V min M and M ∈ M od(µ). Since such V min is a minimal subset of Atom satisfying these properties, it concludes that for any other k-model M of µ, we have 
From Theorem 5, we can show that the following result holds for k 2 . ∧ ¬c) , and a formula µ ≡ K¬a ∧ K¬b. Now we first consider the update of Γ with µ under the operator k 1 . It is easy to see that V min = {a} is the only minimal set of atoms that makes KForget(Γ, V min ) ∧ µ consistent. That is, we have
Theorem 6 Knowledge update operator k 2 satisfies Katsuno and Mendelzon's update postulates (U1) -(U8).

Example 4 Consider a knowledge set
Now we consider the same update under operator k 2 . Since Γ has two k-models: M 1 = {{a, b, c}}, {a, b, c} and M 2 = {{a}}, {a} , M od(KForget (C(M 1 , {a, b,  c}) , {a, b}) ∧(K¬a∧K¬b)) contains a unique k-interpretation M 1 = {{c}}, {c} , where V min = {a, b} is the only minimal set of atoms that makes
Comparing the results of
, it seems that the later gives a more intuitive knowledge update solution: since Γ |= Kc ∨ K¬c, and atom c does not occurs in µ, we would expect that the resulting knowledge set still entails Kc ∨ K¬c. This is true for Γ k 2 µ but not for Γ k 1 µ.
It is worth mentioning that knowledge update operator k 2 is defined in a spirit of the traditional possible models approach (PMA), but under S5 model semantics. By restricting to a propositional language, k 2 coincides with Doherty et al.'s propositional belief update operator [9, 16] -a modified version of PMA.
A knowledge game with bounded memory
As indicated by Fagin et al. [11] , there are scenarios where an agent may have to forget some facts that he knows previously. To show how such a scenario can be modeled using the theory of knowledge forgetting, in this section we study a specific knowledge game with bounded memories in a finite language. The issue of knowledge games has been extensively studied by van Ditmarsch [4] , in which information contained in a game state and information change due to a game action are specifically considered. While memory is usually not an issue in knowledge games, i.e. each agent will never forget his knowledge during a game play, here we will consider that in a game, the player only has bounded memory, therefore in order to continue his play in a game, he may have to forget some of his previous knowledge.
The game
The knowledge game we consider here is a simple card game over a finite domain with only one player. The game is described informally as follows. There are N different cards, each with a number from 1 to N (the player knows that). Before the game starts, these N cards are facing down on the table so that the player cannot see the numbers on these cards. Then the player starts the game by picking up cards from the table, one at a time (of course the player then can see the numbers on the cards he is holding).
However, the player can at most hold M cards at the same time (M < N ). That is, if the player already holds M cards and wants to continue the game, he has to discard one or more cards in order to pick up a new card from the table. The discarded cards then cannot be used any more. The player may pick up at most P cards (M ≤ P ≤ N ) during a game. The game terminates if the player stops the game (e.g. the player has realised that he has won the game), or the player has exhausted all his P cards. The player wins the game if when the game terminates, the player holds M cards and these cards have such a property: sum ∈ X, where sum is the sum of all numbers on these M cards, and X is a set of integers 3 . Otherwise, the player loses the game.
Although this card game looks similar to those proposed by van Ditmarsch, such as Pit [5] , what makes this one different from other card games (knowledge games), is that the player has a bounded memory which leads him to only have imperfect recall. That is, during a game, once the player discards a card, he will forget the number on that card. Then such forgetting will influence the player's current knowledge about the game. We call a game like this a memory bounded card game, and denote as G
N,M,P X
, where parameters N, M, P and X are as described above.
Game states, game actions and game instances
In the following, we will formalize this card game. In particular, we consider game
{6,7} . That is, there are 5 cards named a, b, c, d and e, each with a number from 1 to 5, the player can only hold 2 cards at the same time, and the player can at most pick up 3 cards altogether. The player wins the game if, at the end, he holds two cards having sum of 6 or 7. Results presented in this section can be extended to general cases.
In our formalism, atoms a, b, c, d, e denote that the player holds cards a, b, c, d, e respectively, and atoms sum a+b = 3, sum a+c = 4, · · ·, sum d+e = 9 denote the sums of cards a and b, a and c, · · ·, d and e respectively. Finally atoms guess(a) = 1, guess(a) = 2, · · ·, are used to denote the player's guess of card a's number is 1, cards from {a, b, c, d , e}, n, n(x), n(y), · · ·, are cards' numbers from {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and n(x + y), · · ·, are sums of two cards x and y from {3, · · · , 9} respectively. In this way, we may write guess(x) = n, ¬guess(y) = n(x), sum x+y = n(x + y) and so on to express that the player's guess on card x's number is n, the player will never guess card y's number is the same as card x's number, the sum of cards x and y's numbers is n(x + y), etc..
A game state in a G 5,2,3 {6,7} game is a k-interpretation (W, w), where W is the set of all worlds that the player thinks possible, and w is the actual world where the player is. Since we are formalizing the situation from the player's viewpoint where the player does not know his actual world w, here we may simply refer W to the game state. In an arbitrary G 5,2,3 {6,7} game, the player will always start the same initial state: he has no card in hand, and all cards are on the table. Formally, we specify the
{6,7} game to be the set of worlds, where
Note that if w ∈ W init , then for any other world w such that w ↔ V w, where
{6,7} game, the player can take three kinds of game actions: pick up a card, discard a card, and stop the game. For a given game state W , a game state W is a successor game state (or simply called successor state) of W if W represents a game state resulting from W by taking one of the three game actions, denoted as W = succ(W, α), where
discard(e), stop}.
The following task is to specify succ(W, α) for a given W and α. Towards this aim, we first introduce a useful notion. Let ) to denote an arbitrary guess of the numbers on cards y 1 , y 2 and y 3 (or y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , and y 4 , resp.) from {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} but not including any numbers from X (or Y resp.). For instance, the following are two possible guesses: Definition 6 (Game actions) Let W be a game state, succ(W, pickup(x)), succ(W , discard(x)) and succ(W, stop), where x ∈ {a, b, c, d, e} are defined as:
(1) There are two cases for specifying succ(W, pickup(x)): (a) if ∀w ∈ W, ∃y ∈ w, where y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}\{x}, then succ(W, pickup(x)) = {w * | ∀w ∈ W such that (guess(x) = n(x), sum x+y = n(x+y) ∈ w), w * = w ∪ {x} \ {guess(x) = n(x)}}; (b) if ∀w ∈ W, ∃y ∈ w, where y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}\{x}, then succ(W, pickup(x)) = {w * | ∀w ∈ W such that (guess(x) = n(x) ∈ w), w * = w ∪ {x} \ {guess(x) = n(x)}}; (2) There are two cases for specifying succ(W, discard(x)):
(a) if ∀w ∈ W, ∃y ∈ w, where y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}\{x}, then succ(W, discard(x)) = {w * | w * = {y, τ (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 )|{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} −{n(y)} } ∪ X, where y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ∈ {a, b, c, d, e} \ {x, y}, and X is any subset of {sum a+b = 3, · · · , sum d+e = 9}}; (b) if ∀w ∈ W, ∃y ∈ w, where y ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}\{x}, then succ(W, discard(x)) = {w * | w * = {τ (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 )|{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} −∅ } ∪ X, where y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 ∈ {a, b, c, d, e} \ {x} and X is any subset of {sum a+b = 3, · · · , sum d+e = 9};
Let us take a closer look at condition (1) in Definition 6. Consider the definition of succ(W, pickup(a)) first. Suppose the current game state of the player is W , in which the player already holds one card, say card b for example. Then after the player picks up card a, the player should hold both cards a and b, and thus the player also knows the sum sum a+b of a and b. At this time, the player does not guess the number on card a any more, but still has to guess other cards' numbers that are not in his hand. Condition (1.a) in Definition 6 exactly captures this intuition. If the player does not hold any card at the state W , then after picking up card a, the only information change is that the player does not guess card a's number, while other information represented in W does not change, as condition (1.b) in Definition 6 shows. A similar explanation follows for condition (2) . Finally, since there is no information change when the player stops the game, we have succ(W, stop) = W .
Definition 7 (Game instance)
{6,7} is a finite sequence of game states associating with a sequence of game actions:
In Definition 7, we call W k the final game state of instance I. Note that if the player stops the game, then we always have W k = succ(W k−1 , stop) = W k−1 . However, the game may also terminate if the player has exhausted his three cards. For a given S5 formula φ and a game instance I, we also write W |= I φ if W |= φ and W is a game state in I.
Example 5
The following is a game instance for game G 5,2,3 {6,7} :
It is easy to see that W 6 |= I 1 Ksum b+c = 5, from which we know that the player loses the game in I 1 .
Knowledge characteristic of game
We have provided a semantic description for knowledge game G
5,2,3
{6,7} by using kinterpretations. To reason about the player's knowledge in a game instance, we would also prefer a logical account to characterize this semantic description, so that reasoning about the player's knowledge can be carried over at a logical level.
Since we deal with a finite language, from a given game state W , we always can construct a knowledge set T that completely characterizes the information represented in W . That is, for any S5 formula ϕ, we will have
as showed in [4] . However, such construction will make T exponentially large -the same size of W . As an alternative, we would like to define such knowledge set T in a succinct and syntactic way. But having a succinct characteristic of a game state will no longer guarantee that (3) always holds. In the following, we will specify an alternative characteristic criterion which is weaker than (3) but still effective enough for our purpose.
A formula is called knowledge formula if it is of the form Kφ where φ is objective. Under our knowledge game extent, although arbitrary S5 formulas will be used in describing game constraints and states (see the following), we can see that mainly knowledge formulas are of interests in reasoning about the player's knowledge in a game instance. Obviously, if T is a knowledge characteristic of W , T can be viewed as a complete characterization of W in terms of knowledge formulas. We say that a kinterpretation W is a maximal k-model of T , if W ∈ M od(T ) and there does not exist another k-model W ∈ M od(T ) such that W ⊂ W (i.e. proper set inclusion). Then the following theorem is important for identifying a knowledge characteristic for a given k-interpretation.
Theorem 7 Let T be a knowledge set and W
Proof. Suppose W is the unique maximal k-model of T . Since W ∈ M od(T ), then for any formula Kφ where φ is propositional, T |= Kφ implies W |= Kφ. Now consider that T |= Kφ. In this case, there must be some k-model of T , say W ∈ M od(T ), such that W |= Kφ. Since W is the unique maximal k-model of T , we have W ⊆ W . This follows that W |= Kφ. 2
Definition 9 (Knowledge characteristic of instance I)
{6,7} , and T = T 1 , · · · , T k a sequence of knowledge sets. We say that T is a knowledge characteristic of instance I if for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ k), T i is a knowledge characteristic of game state W i .
In the following, we will show that we can use our knowledge forgetting effectively define such T mentioned in Definition 9. We first specify a knowledge set T c consisting of game constraints as follows: T c represents basic game constraints that every game state in any game instance should satisfy. The intuitive meaning of these formulas is quite obvious. For instance, holdCard states that if the player holds a card, then he knows that he is holding that card. In this case the player will not need to guess the card's number, and also the player should then not guess this card's number for other cards.
knowSum says that if the player has held two cards, then he knows the sum of these two cards' numbers. On the other hand, not knowSum indicates that if the player does not hold a card, then the player does not know the sum of this card's number with any other card's numbers. Finally, guessCard simply says that the player will never guess two cards with the same number. Now we specify T 0 to be a knowledge set consisting of the following formulas:
x∈{a,b,c,d,e} ¬x, and x∈{a,b,c,d,e} K( n∈{1,2,3,4,5} guess(x) = n), and let T init = T 0 ∧ T c be the initial knowledge set that represents the initial game state W init for any game instances.
Proposition 6 T init is a knowledge characteristic of W init .
Proof. According to Theorem 7, it is sufficient to prove that W init is the unique maximal k-model of T init . From the fact that T init = T 0 ∧ T c , it is easy to see that for any k-model W of T init and each world w ∈ W , w must contain one of the following variables from {guess(a) = n 1 , guess(b) = n 2 , guess(c) = n 3 , guess(d) = n 4 , guess(e) = n 5 }, where n i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}; w does not contain any variables from {a, b, c, d, e}; and w may or may not contain variables from {sum a+b = 3, · · · , sum d+e = 9}. This means that each world w ∈ W is also in W init . So W init is the unique maximal k-model of T init . 2
Suppose that a given T is a knowledge characteristic of some game state W , and W = succ(W, α) is a successor state of W by taking action α. Then by using knowledge forgetting, we can derive a new knowledge set T from T which is also a knowledge characteristic of W . To begin with, we first introduce the following notions:
∆(x) = {x} ∪ n∈{1,2,3,4,5} {guess(x) = n} ∪ y∈{a,b,c,d,e},y =x {sum x+y = n(x + y)}, and Θ(x) = ∆(x) ∪ y∈{a,b,c,d,e}\{x},n∈{1,2,3,4,5} {guess(y) = n}.
Intuitively, ∆(x) is the set of atoms that contains card x and other atoms that are directly associated to x, while Θ(x) contains some extra atoms whose truth values may be affected by discarding card x. Now we further specify a formula: persist(T, {x}) = y∈{a,b,c,d,e}\{x} ((T → n∈{1,2,3,4,5} guess(y) = n) → n∈{1,2,3,4,5} guess(y) = n). The intuitive meaning of persist(T, {x}) is that if at some game state (that is characterized by T ) the player has a guess for any card from {a, b, c, d, e} \ {x}, then the player should also have a guess for this card after discarding card x. Proof. We prove by induction that for each i, W i is the unique maximal k-model of T i . From the proof of Proposition 6, we know that W init is the unique maximal k-model of T init . Assume for all i < k, W i is the unique maximal k-model of T i . We need to show that W k is also a unique maximal k-model of T k . There are three cases we should consider: (1) W k = succ(W k−1 , pickup(x)), (2) W k = succ(W k−1 , discard(x)), and (3) W k = succ(W k−1 , stop). (3) is trivial. For Case (1) , there are four subcases: (1.1) the player already holds a card y in W k−1 , and the player has not discarded any card before; (1.2) the player already holds a card y in W k−1 , but also the player has previously discarded a card y ; (1.3) before picking up card x, the player has no card in hand, and the player has not discarded any card yet; and (1.4) before picking up card x, the player has no card in hand, and the player has previously discarded a card y. For Case (2) , there are two subcases: (2.1) the player has two cards x and y in hand before discarding card x; and (2.2) the player only has card x in hand before discarding x. Proofs for all these subcases are quite tedious but straightforward following the definitions and propositions presented in this section. So we omit those details. 2
Proof for Case
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we examined the notion of knowledge forgetting under S5 modal logic. We provided a complete characterization on knowledge forgetting through four postulates, and investigated its useful applications in knowledge updates and knowledge games.
Many related issues remain for further study. In this paper, we only addressed the problem of knowledge forgetting in modal logic S5. In a multi-agent system, it is more common that an agent not only needs to forget his own knowledge due to a memory limit, but also has to forget other agents' knowledge for various reasons. So generalizing our knowledge forgetting to the multi-agent modal logic S5 (and other multi-agent modal logics) will be a challenge. One particular concern we should take into account in this development is common knowledge which does not occur in single agent modal logic.
